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On August 1, 2006, the Indonesian government passed a new nationality law to 
replace the 1958 edition, which was deemed outdated and particularly discriminatory. 
It took approximately a year for a special commission of lawmakers to draft the new 
law, with the support and active contribution of various civil-rights groups. As a 
minority group, Chinese-Indonesians are especially pleased with the new nationality 
law, as it redefines the legal framework of national belonging. It propounds a new 
definition of "citizen" (Warga Negara Indonesia, WNI) that no longer distinguishes 
ethnic Chinese—formerly known as citizens of foreign descent (WNI keturunan asing)— 
from citizens considered to be indigenous Indonesian (WNI asli), and, as such, 
promises to encode the very notion of equality that has long eluded the Chinese. The 
new law blurs the boundary between the supposedly "natural" Indonesians and those 
who have had to go through cultural naturalization (asimilasi) in order to become 
"Indonesian." More specifically, it no longer defines "indigenous Indonesians"—the 
natural citizens,2 so to speak—as those who are native to the state's territorial
11 am grateful to Caroline Hau, Benedict Anderson, Didi Kwartanada, Evi Sutrisno, the HAS, and 
Indonesia's editors and anonymous reviewers for comments or other types of support in the writing of this 
essay. Any remaining errors are, however, my own.
2 The nation-state operates on the assumption that there is a natural bond between the state and its people, 
which in most cases is identical with the so-called "natives," or the majority ethnic group in the nation. In 
the same way, the deliberations on Indonesian citizenship during the 1945 constitutional convention
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jurisdiction, but, rather, as those who were born to Indonesian citizenship and have 
never held any other citizenship deliberately. So, rather than being based on a 
hereditary principle, the new definition of "indigenous" becomes strictly legal, in that 
it hinges on the history of one's national status.
Immediate reactions after the parliament passed the new law were, as expected, 
jubilant. News media cited tears of joy, plenty of cheers, and an impromptu rendition 
of the national anthem from the assembly's audience. It marks the "dawn of a new era" 
for the Chinese in Indonesia, proclaimed an article in Kompas; 3 a monumental 
achievement, commended President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono in Media Indonesia;4 a 
new paradigm, wrote then-Minister of Law and Human Rights Hamid Awaludin in an 
op-ed article;5 a revolutionary law and a breakthrough, echoed others.6 The new 
nationality law, a Jakarta Post editorial concluded, "has effectively put an end to racial 
segregation as it recognizes Chinese-Indonesians as part of the country's indigenous 
people."7 The Banjarmasin Post went so far as to proclaim in its article title that "Ethnic 
Chinese Can Become President."8 A book published in January 2007, Jalan Panjang 
Menjadi WNI (Long Road to Becoming Indonesian Citizens), suggests a discursive 
obituary, as it recounts the protracted struggle for equality by the Chinese.9 Another 
book, published in February 2008, a compilation of newspaper articles written by 
young Chinese-Indonesian intellectuals, confidently titled Cokin? So What Gitu Lohl 
(Chinese? So What!), encourages a bolder assertion of the Chinese identity, which 
presumably has been buried for a long time in the racial closet.10
The book Cokin?, whose contributors teamed up under the name Jaringan 
Tionghoa Muda (Young Chinese-Indonesian Network), not only recommends a new 
mindset for the Chinese, but seeks to move away from worn-out discourses such as the 
totok versus peranakan (full-blooded vs. creolized Chinese) divide, the contentious 
designation "Cina" versus 'Tionghoa" (the supposedly derogatory and neutral 
Indonesian terms for "Chinese"), and the so-called "three streams" of Chinese political
focused largely on the status of residents of foreign descent. The indigenous people of Indonesia were 
naturally Indonesian citizens, according to Professor Soepomo—the architect of the 1945 Constitution; see 
Saafroedin Bahar and Nannie Hudawah, eds., Risalah Sidang Badan Penyelidik Usaha-usalw Persiapan 
Kemerdekaan Indonesia (BPUPKI)-Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia (PPKI), 28 Mei 1945—22 Agustus 
1945 (Jakarta: Sekretariat Negara Republik Indonesia, 1998), p. 342.
3 Sutta Dharmasaputra, "RUU Kewarganegaraan Disetujui: Sebuah Babak Baru Dimulai," Kompas, July 12, 
2006.
4 "Karya Monumental Anak Bangsa, UU Kewarganegaraan Hapus Diskriminasi," Media Indonesia, July 12, 
2006.
5 Hamid Awaludin, "UU Kewarganegaraan: Ketika Paradigma Berubah," Kompas, July 25, 2006.
6 See "RUU Kewarganegaraan Revolusioner: Asas Nondiskriminatif Diterapkan," Kompas, July 8, 2006; 
"Bangsa Indonesia Asli Tak Lagi Berdasarkan Etnis," Suara Pembaruan, July 8, 2006; "UU 
Kewarganegaraan Baru Disetujui: Pri-Nonpri Dihapus," Bali Post, July 12, 2006; and "UU 
Kewarganegaraan: Diskriminasi Pada Etnis Tionghoa Harus Hilang," Suara Pembaruan, July 17, 2006.
7 "Year of the Rat," ]akarta Post, February 6, 2008.
8 "Tionghoa Bisa Jadi Presiden," Banjarmasin Post, July 12, 2006.
9 Chris Verdiansyah, ed., Jalan Panjang Menjadi WNI: Catatan Pengalaman dan Tinjauan Kritis (Jakarta: 
Penerbit Buku Kompas, 2007).
10 Ivan Wibowo, ed., Cokin? So What Gitu Lohl (Depok: Komunitas Bambu, 2008).
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orientations during the colonial period.11 It invites the Chinese to look toward their 
future in Indonesia with an attitude of self-reliance, in that their collective self­
definition should no longer be narrowly framed by the perpetual quest for approval 
from the national majority. The new Chinese identity is to be assertive, guilt-free, and 
unburdened by the perpetual need for any Chinese to prove her or his patriotism—that 
is to say, to be normal Indonesians.
All the enthusiastic responses and, indeed, daring propositions should rightly 
make the Chinese optimistic about their standing in the social and political landscape 
of Indonesia today. But retreats from talking about the past also open the way to 
historical amnesia. A closer look into past discourses on Indonesian citizenship 
suggests that the recent Chinese celebration of inclusive legislation is rather premature 
and, arguably, a corollary of selective memory. The long-held perception that previous 
nationality laws—specifically the clause on indigenousness—were particularly 
prejudiced against ethnic Chinese is arguably misconstrued. By scrutinizing 
proceedings from the 1945 constitutional convention,12 this essay seeks to demonstrate 
that the definition of "citizen" in the 1945 Constitution is no less inclusive than that in 
the 2006 law, both in rhetoric and intention. At this point, a brief history of the national 
status of ethnic Chinese in Indonesia is necessary to provide the context for my 
argument.
From Subject to Citizen
The migration of people from the southeastern coast of China to the Indian 
archipelago had taken place long before the Dutch government took over from the 
United East Asia Company and formally established the Netherlands Indies. But due 
to their small number, these mostly male early migrants were largely assimilated, 
converted to Islam, and eventually absorbed into the local population.13 In the latter 
half of the nineteenth century, however, there were attempts to resinicize these 
creolized Chinese, which seem to have been motivated by large influxes of new 
migrants from China.14 The totok newcomers no doubt made the peranakan Chinese 
increasingly aware of their extra-Indies origin and identity. The first Sino-Japanese war 
and the reform and subsequent revolutionary movements in China at the turn of the 
century further stimulated the feeling of identification among Chinese migrants, both 
China- and Indies-born, with a national homeland, which encompassed their
11 Wibowo, Cokin ?, pp. x-xiii. The three streams are, approximately, political outlooks that divided 
colonial Chinese groups into those that oriented themselves to China, those that identified with the 
existing Dutch imperialist structure, and those that sought to be part of an independent Indonesia.
12 The term "constitutional convention" is used with caution here as it refers to the committee that 
deliberated and drafted the 1945 Constitution, not the subsequent (much smaller) committee that formally 
sanctioned the constitution the day after Indonesia declared independence. The latter committee was more 
representative because it included delegations from Sumatra, Bali, and Eastern Indonesia, but for all 
intents and purposes, its role regarding the constitution was a formality.
13 G. William Skinner, "Creolized Chinese Societies in Southeast Asia," in Sojourners and Settlers: Histories of 
Southeast Asia and the Chinese, ed. Anthony Reid (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1996), pp. 51-93.
14 Claudine Salmon's study of ancestral halls and funeral associations in Java and Makassar suggests that 
there were attempts to revive Chinese customs in the face of newcomers who were contemptuous of the 
creolized, "degenerated" Chinese; see her chapter, "Ancestral Halls, Funeral Associations, and Attempts at 
Resinicization in Nineteenth-Century Netherlands India," in Sojourners and Settlers, pp. 183-214.
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provincial origins. Meanwhile, the principle of nationality that swept across Europe in 
the middle of the nineteenth century and that was behind the drive for reform in China 
(eventually turning the dynastic empire into a republic in 1912) also ushered in a new 
international system in which intercourse on equal footing (at least in principle) was 
possible among free and progressive nations. Thus, it was the idea that the standing of 
the Chinese population in the Dutch colony could somehow be elevated if China were 
to become a strong modern nation—that the Chinese could somehow become equal to 
the Dutch and the Japanese.15—that was behind a series of self-imposed reforms to 
"recover" the Chinese identity and culture among the peranakan in Java. These reforms 
began with the establishment of a community association for the promotion of 
Confucianism, Tiong Hoa Hwe Koan (THHK, Chinese Association), in Batavia in 1900, 
and, subsequently, the development of numerous modern (Japan and France-modeled) 
THHK-affiliated schools in many parts of the colony.16 The outcome of these efforts, 
inevitably, was the sharpening of the imagined distinction between "Chinese" and the 
"native" populations, which was acceptable and beneficial to the Chinese so long as 
they existed within the colonial structure. But the same ideological forces that turned 
China into a nation-state in the early twentieth century eventually came to the Indies, 
emancipated the populations, and once again put the Chinese in a political (and legal) 
predicament. The 2006 Nationality Law proves that Chinese national status in 
Indonesia has been an enduring question.
As stated above, the 2006 Nationality Law (UU No. 12/2006) is a substitute for the 
one sanctioned in 1958 (UU No. 62/1958). The latter, however, was not the basis of the 
contentious definition of "citizen," nor did it present a new delineation as to who 
constituted "the citizens" in Indonesia. It used, rather, the historical event of the 
nation's proclamation of independence, on August 17, 1945, as a defining temporal 
marker. The citizens, the 1958 law proclaimed, are those who, in accordance with the 
laws and treaties that have gone into effect since the declaration of independence, have 
become citizens of the Republic of Indonesia.
15 In 1899, the Netherlands Indies government granted Japanese people European status in part as 
recognition of Japan's growing military power. In essence, this is also an acknowledgement of Japan as a 
strong modern state, which subsequently inspired a nationalist sentiment among Chinese people in the 
Indies. See Leo Suryadinata, Peranakan Chinese Politics in Java, 1917-1942 (Singapore: Singapore University 
Press, 1981), p. 5.
16 Historian and THHK treasurer Nio Joe Lan, chronicling THHK and its efforts to rally Indies Chinese 
under the banner of Confucianism, noted a number of amusing anecdotes arising from the general 
uncertainty of what being "Chinese" was supposed to entail. Here are three examples: Planned weekly 
public lectures on Confucianism in Mandarin quickly turned into lectures in Malay, presumably because 
very few potential audience members actually understood Mandarin; letters were written by insecure 
Chinese regarding superstitions and the shedding of one's pigtail (boeang thauwtjang): and a plea was 
issued for the eradication of rickshaws in Palembang, because pulling rickshaws "not only diminishes 
human dignity, [...] but is especially detrimental to the prestige of the Chinese nation." See Nio, Riumjat 40 
Toon dari Tiong Hoa Kwee Koan—Batavia, 1900-1939 (Batavia: Tiong Hoa Kwee Koan, 1940), pp. 28, 33,181. 
This Chinese revival may also be related to a general effort to raise the national standing of Chinese people 
overseas, which emanated from China as a response to the Chinese exclusion law in the United States and 
general anti-Chinese sentiments in the United States and Australia in the last decades of the nineteenth 
century. The Chinese government promoted moral self-discipline among migrants, and urged them to 
avoid vices and crimes often associated with Chinese migrants—like opium, gambling, and human 
smuggling—in order to create a better international image. See Adam McKeown, Melancholy Order: Asian 
Migration and the Globalization o f Borders (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2008), pp. 121-84.
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So what is relevant for our discussion here is not the 1958 law itself, but the 
accepted definition of "citizen" at the birth of the Indonesian state. Many studies have 
been devoted to the laws and treaties regarding Indonesian citizenship that have gone 
into effect since the transfer of sovereignty,17 but there has not been an examination of 
the definition of citizen at the time of independence. A 1988 article by Mary Somers 
Heidhues on ethnic Chinese and the Indonesian revolution touches upon the issue of 
citizenship, but leaves out the 1945 constitutional deliberation that produced the 
nation's first definition of citizen and the first nationality law.18
During the colonial period, the Government Act of 1854 granted all Indies-born 
Chinese the same status as the indigenous population in legal and administrative 
matters. The existing Dutch civil law defined anyone born in the Netherlands or its 
colonies as a Dutch citizen, but applied restrictions to non-Europeans in the colonies.19 
This status nonetheless granted colony-born non-Europeans the privileges of Dutch 
citizenship while abroad. In 1892, by another pronouncement, Chinese in the Indies 
came to be designated as "foreigners."20 That lasted until 1910, when the Netherlands 
Citizenship Act redesignated all non-European residents of the Indies—indigenous 
and native-born—Dutch subjects (Nederlandsch onderdanen).21 In terms of the civil code, 
the government organized the Indies population into four categories: Europeans (by 
Staatsblad 1849), Chinese (Staatsblad 1917), Natives (Staatsblad 1920), and Christian 
Natives (Staatsblad 1933).
When Indonesia declared independence in 1945, those distinctions shifted, as the 
1945 Constitution ruled that "citizens are persons who are indigenous Indonesians and 
persons of another nationality who become citizens by way of law." Thus, rather than 
citing race and religion as determinants, as was done under the colonial 
administration's civil code, the defining property of citizenship in independent 
Indonesia came to pivot on the attribute of indigeneity. In other words, the indigenous 
people in the former Netherlands Indies territory came to be regarded as the natural, 
therefore principal, component of the nation.
It was this provision of indigeneity, many scholars and advocates of Chinese 
groups contended, that had effectively barred the Chinese population from becoming 
an equal constituent of the nation. Charles Coppel, an authority in the field, wrote of 
the legal distinction between indigenous and alien as a "virus of racial separation."22
17 In particular, see the works by Donald E. Willmott, The National Status of the Chinese in Indonesia, 1900- 
1958 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1961); Leo Suryadinata, ed., Political Thinking of the 
Indonesian Chinese, 1900-1995 (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1997); and Charles A. Coppel, "The 
Indonesian Chinese: 'Foreign Orientals,' Netherlands Subjects, and Indonesian Citizens," in Law and the 
Chinese in Southeast Asia, ed. M. B. Hooker (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2002).
18 Mary F. Somers Heidhues, "Citizenship and Identity: Ethnic Chinese and the Indonesian Revolution," in 
Changing Identities of the Southeast Asian Chinese since World War II, ed. Jennifer Cushman and Wang Gung 
Wu (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1988), pp. 115-38.
19 Willmott, The National Status of the Chinese, p. 13.
20 Since the early nineteenth century, the term "Foreign Orientals" (Vreemde Oosterlingen) had been applied 
to "Asians" such as the Chinese and Arabs; see Mona Lohanda, Growing Pains: The Chinese and the Dutch in 
Colonial Java, 1890-1942 (Jakarta: Yayasan Cipta Loka Caraka, 2002), p. 79.
21 Scholars have pointed out that the reclassification of Indies Chinese from "foreigners" to "subjects" 
(based on jus soli) was partly in response to the enactment of the 1909 Nationality Law in China, which 
recognized all Chinese descendants, regardless of birthplace, as Chinese nationals (based on jus sanguinis).
22 Coppel, "The Indonesian Chinese," pp. 131-49.
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Most Chinese-Indonesians, too, believed that they were treated as "second-class 
citizens," as "outsiders," even "suspects" in terms of national security, because they 
were not regarded as indigenous to Indonesia. On the contrary, their "artificial" 
membership in the nation accounted for the state's perpetual attempts to assimilate 
them and efforts by Chinese themselves to validate their claim of belonging. It is 
precisely for this reason that the 2006 inclusion of ethnic Chinese and other non-natives 
in the new definition of “asli” (indigenous, authentic, original) is seen as revolutionary 
and, as such, a cause for celebration.
A year after Indonesia declared independence, a law on citizenship was passed 
(UU No. 3/1946) and then amended (UU No. 6/1947). In it, all indigenous people 
inside the territory of Indonesia and residents of the former Netherlands Indies of any 
ethnic heritage who were over twenty-one years of age and who had resided in the 
former colony for a minimum of five years were automatically granted Indonesian 
citizenship.23 The law was inclusive of ethnic Chinese, but hence gave rise to 
complications, as the government in China, by its 1909 (Qing) and 1929 (Republic of 
China) Nationality laws, insisted that descendants of a Chinese person, regardless of 
birthplace, were Chinese nationals.24 As a result, when Indonesia passed its first 
nationality law in 1946, the involuntary nature of Indonesian citizenship became a 
matter of contention for those who wished to remain Chinese citizens, and created a 
condition of dual citizenship.
In 1955, Indonesia came to an agreement with the People's Republic of China to 
resolve the problem of dual citizenship for ethnic Chinese residing in Indonesia.25 The 
agreement was signed into law in January 1958 (UU No. 2/1958), and its 
implementation was to be concluded in 1962.26 From the point of view of the 
Indonesian government, the intervening period was to serve as a window of 
opportunity for individual Chinese to decide their own citizenship status proactively.2' 
The emphasis on an "active" system reflected a new approach by the government, 
which aimed "to have as citizens only those Chinese who would be willing to make an 
official and public declaration repudiating their Chinese citizenship."28 The 1958 
Nationality Law, which was passed half a year later, makes a point in Article 4 that a 
foreign national who was born and lives in the territory of the Republic of Indonesia 
"can apply for Indonesian citizenship on condition that upon conferral of the 
citizenship s/he will no longer hold any other citizenship, or that when applying s/he 
also submits a disclaimer of other citizenship which s/he may be holding, in
23 The itemized clause was amended to the original nationality law with UU No. 6/1947. Other 
adjustments are made in UU No. 8/1947 and No. 11/1948.
24 For an overview of China's nationality laws, see Leo Suryadinata, "China's Citizenship Law and the 
Chinese in Southeast Asia," in Law and the Chinese in Southeast Asia, pp. 169-84.
25 The accord, "Agreement on the Issue of Dual Nationality between the Republic of Indonesia and the 
People's Republic of China," signaled recognition by the two states that their unilateral laws had created 
the unintended consequence of establishing dual citizenship for ethnic Chinese in Indonesia and thus 
placed them in a citizenship limbo. See Kementerian Penerangan, Asian-African Conference: Speeches and 
Communiques (Djakarta: Kementerian Penerangan Republik Indonesia, 1955).
26 The full heading of the law was "Undang-undang No. 2/1958 tentang persetujuan perjanjian antara RI 
dan RRT mengenai soal dwi-kewarganegaraan" (Act No. 2/1958 on the treaty between the Republic of 
Indonesia and the People's Republic of China on the issue of dual citizenship).
27 This is as stated in the Explanation section of UU No. 4/1969, point number 3.
28 Willmott, The National Status of the Chinese, p. 47.
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accordance with the laws of her/his country of origin or with the regulations for the 
resolution of dual citizenship between the Republic of Indonesia and the country 
involved."
With the sanctioning of the 1958 Nationality Law, the right to repudiate became an 
obligation to choose. Those who had been assigned either a Chinese or an Indonesian 
citizenship involuntarily had to select affirmatively Chinese citizenship or, for those 
who wished to retain Indonesian citizenship, to legally renounce Chinese citizenship. 
Rather than rely on the principle of passive acceptance applied by the 1946 Nationality 
Law, Chinese membership in the Indonesian nation came to require active 
endorsement within a limited period of time. By January 1962, all ethnic Chinese 
regardless of genealogical tenure in Indonesia were obliged to have resolved their dual 
citizen status. In reality, of course, many Chinese did not take the required steps to 
clarify their citizenship status, and thus remained in legal limbo. After Indonesia's 1967 
regime change, the 1958 treaty, which recognized the condition of dual citizenship for 
a period of time, was repealed and replaced (UU No. 4/1969). At the time, the 
possibility of having Indonesian citizens who were simultaneously citizens of a foreign 
(not to mention communist) country was deemed "hazardous for the security of the 
Republic." Unfairness toward the indigenous majority and the suspension of 
diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China were also cited as reasons for 
banning dual citizenship.2"
Indeed, the national status of the Chinese in Indonesia has been problematic, but it 
is not true that the country's nationality laws have always been discriminatory against 
ethnic Chinese. The title of the aforementioned book, Jalan Panjang Menjadi WNI, for 
instance, gives an impression that the laborious process of Chinese integration in 
Indonesia involved a long journey toward becoming "citizens." This is a 
mischaracterization, as the majority of ethnic Chinese, by 1980, had become formal 
citizens,2" even if the legal procedure required for establishing Indonesian citizenship 
was convoluted and plagued by bureaucratic corruption. If the substantive 
citizenship—which entails equality in terms of rights, privileges, access to state 
resources, and political participation—has only recently improved for the Chinese, the 
formal citizenship has been accorded to them from the very beginning. It is perhaps 
more accurate to say that the Chinese are citizens (warga negara) of Indonesia—insofar 
as citizenship signifies membership in the state—but are not widely perceived as 
members of the nation (warga bangsa).29 301 This is why an examination of Chinese self­
perception is as vital as a review of their legal transformation into becoming 
Indonesian citizens. My examination of the 1945 constitutional deliberations, in fact,
29 Badan Koordinasi Masalah Cina—BAKIN, Pedoman Penyelesaian Masalah Cina di Indonesia, Vol. 1 (Jakarta: 
Badan Koordinasi Intelijen Negara, 1979).
30 Mary Somers Heidhues wrote that by the time of the 1980 census, the number of alien Chinese had been 
reduced to fewer than 20 percent; see Heidhues, "Citizenship and Identity," pp. 115-38.
31 Stephen Castles distinguishes citizenship and nationality as memberships in, respectively, a state and a 
nation. As the compound form nation-state has become the most prevalent political unit, the terms 
"citizen" and "national" have been used interchangeably; see Castles, Ethnicity and Globalization: From 
Migrant Worker to Transnational Citizen (London: Sage Publications, 2000). In this article I use the term 
"nationality" in a broader sense, as in the national status of ethnic Chinese under the Qing dynasty, 
whereas I use "citizen" in a stricter sense to mean legal membership in modern polities.
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reveals skepticism on the part of the Chinese delegates with regard to Indonesian 
nationality.
This leads us to question whether or not a new and broad definition of 
"indigenous" can actually solve the Chinese "second class" problem. To find out if the 
2006 Nationality Law is truly revolutionary—an effect of a historical rupture with the 
past—or merely an empty signifier without significant causative weight, let us look 
back at the conceptualization of citizenship at the birth of the Indonesian state and, 
more importantly, at how the Chinese reacted to Indonesian citizenship then.
Defining "Citizen" in 1945
It is a common misconception among Chinese-Indonesians today to think of 
previous nationality laws, which took the definition of "citizen" from the 1945 
Constitution, as particularly prejudiced against them. In the closing months of the 
Japanese occupation, the Investigative Committee for the Preparations for 
Independence (Badan Penjelidik Oesaha-oesaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan; in Japanese, 
Dokuritsu Junbi Chosakai)22 began the process of laying out the grounds for the 
promised independence of Indonesia, anticipated to be implemented on September 7, 
1945. This process came at a time when Japan's grip over Southeast Asia had become 
increasingly weak, but the outcome of the Japanese-sponsored Investigative 
Committee proved to have lasting consequences. The committee commenced its work 
on May 29,1945, in Jakarta and, in the second convention, July 10-17, discussed among 
other things the matter of citizenship in order to draft what was to be the 1945 
Constitution.
Far from being rigid and exclusive, proceedings from the convention convey a 
feeling of novelty, even flexibility, with regard to the concept "citizen" among the 
sixty-two members of the committee.32 3 For these former Dutch subjects (kawoela), there 
was hardly a normative Indonesian equivalent for "citizen." Soepomo used what is 
today the standard designation, "warga negara,"34 and Soekardjo Wirjopranoto35 used
32 In the pronouncement dated March 1, 2605 (1945), issued by the Japanese Supreme Commander (saikoo 
sikiknn) of Java and Madura, this body was referred to as "badan oentoek menjelidiki oesaha-oesaha 
persiapan kemerdekaan," that is, a committee to investigate the preparations for independence; see 
"Pengoemoeman Saikoo Sikikan," Kan Po, no. 62, p. 26. Later, the name of this body and its spelling was 
standardized in Indonesian history textbooks as "Badan Penyelidik Usaha-usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan 
Indonesia" (BPUPKI), or Investigative Committee for the Preparation of Indonesia's Independence.
33 Minutes of the convention are compiled in Bahar and Hudawati, eds., Risalah Sidang Badan Penyelidik 
Usaha-usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia (BPUPKI)—Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia (PPKI) 
(Minutes from the Convention of the Investigative Committee for the Preparation of Indonesia's 
Independence—Committee for the Preparation of Indonesia's Independence).
34 A book put together by the Japanese Center for Military Operation (Gunseikanbu) lists Prof. Raden 
Soepomo as a legal scholar who received his doctorate from Leiden University and taught at the Academy 
of Law (Rechts Hoogeschool). During the Japanese occupation, he was also head of the Bureau for Legal 
Affairs (Houki Kyoku) and member of the Committee for Customary Law and Governance (Panitya Adat 
dan Tatanegara); see Gunseikanbu, Orang Indonesia jang Terkemoeka di Djawa (Djakarta: Gunseikanbu, 1944), 
p. 159.
35 Soekardjo Wirjopranoto was an activist with Boedi Oetomo and then with Partai Indonesia Raya 
(Greater Indonesia Party). Later on, he served at different times as head of the newspapers Berita Oemoem 
and Asia Raya; as junior chief for the Association of Newspapers in Java (Djawa Shimbun Kai); and as a
'We the (Chinese) People' 93
"penduduk negara" (residents of the state), but Muhammad Yamin opted for "putra 
negara" (sons of the state),36 while others talked variously of "warga Indonesia" 
(members of Indonesia), "rakyat Indonesia" (Indonesian people), and used the terms 
"kewargaan" (societal membership) and "kerakyatan" (peoplehood) for 
"citizenship."37
Linguistic inconsistencies notwithstanding, the overriding question in the 
discussion was clear: Who was to be designated as "the people" in the soon-to-be 
sovereign Indonesia? While nearly all members of the committee were unequivocal in 
their aspiration to become constituents of the new state, representatives of Chinese 
groups could not have been more contradictory. The Chinese delegates of East Java, 
Central Java, and West Java were granted a hearing on July 11, 1945. There were four 
Chinese members in the committee, but only three of them—Liem Koen Hian, Oei 
Tjong Hauw, and Oei Tiang Tjoei—spoke in the capacity of representatives of Chinese 
groups.38 There is no record that the fourth delegate, Tan Eng Hoa, delivered a speech. 
He was a legal scholar, not a prominent Chinese figure like the others, and his opinion 
(in this regard) was probably not sought, either.39 Responses by these delegates to the
member of the Committee for Customary Law and Governance and the Central Advisory Board during 
the Japanese occupation; see Gunseikanbu, Orang Indonesia, p. 293.
36 Muhammad Yamin, a member of the House of Representatives (Deumn Ra'jat), was appointed advisor 
for the Department of Propaganda (Sendenbu) by the Japanese authorities. Previously he served as chair of 
the central boards of Partai Persatuan Indonesia (United Indonesian Party), Indonesia Moeda (Young 
Indonesia), and Jong Sumatranen Bond (Association of Young Sumatrans); see ibid., p. 472.
37 See, for instance, the speeches by delegates Yamin, Liem Koen Hian, Oei Tjong Hauw, A. R. Baswedan, 
Soepomo, and Soekardjo Wirjopranoto in Bahar and Hudawati, eds., Risalah Sidang, pp. 29,189,191, 214, 
216, 342, 343.
35 The official publication of the State Secretariat, Bahar and Hudawati's Risalah Sidang (p. 674), 
misidentified Yap Tjwan Bing as a member of both the Investigative Committee (BPUPKI) and the 
Committee for the Preparation of Indonesia's Independence (PPKI) when, in fact, he only served in the 
latter. From Oei Tjong Hauw's speech, we learn that Yap was involved in the eighth and final deliberation 
by the Japan-appointed Central Advisory Board (Chno Sangi-in), whose members also served on the 
Investigative Committee, between June 18 and 21,1945; see Ananda B. Kusuma, Lahirnya Undang-undang 
Dasar 1945 (Depok: Fakultas Hukum Universitas Indonesia, 2004), p. 288. In PPKI, the subsequent, much 
smaller, preparatory committee, Yap was the sole representative of the Chinese group. But at that point 
the draft constitution on citizenship had been established and nothing was altered. Yap was a pharmacist, 
but was active in politics; his pro-Indonesia stand brought him close to the nationalist leaders and made 
him a member of Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI, Indonesian Nationalist Party). Soon after the transfer of 
sovereignty, he was appointed to an advisory body to the president, Central Indonesian National 
Committee (Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat, KNIP), and then served in the parliament for PNI from 
1950 to 1954. Yap resided in Bandung, but migrated to the United States with his family after the 1963 
attacks on Bandung's ethnic Chinese; he remained in the US due to health problems. See Yap Tjwan Bing, 
Meretas Jahm Kemerdekaan: Otobiografi Seorang Pejuang Kemerdekaan (Jakarta: Gramedia, 1988).
39 Tan Eng Hoa was one of nineteen appointed to a committee headed by Soekarno responsible for 
preparing the draft constitution; see Kusuma, Lahirnya Undang-undang Dasar, pp. 292-93. Curiously, very 
little is known about Tan Eng Hoa, who passed away rather young in 1949. The short biography of 
delegates in Bahar and Hudawati's Risalah Sidang only states that he was born in 1907 in Semarang, 
attended a Dutch high school (Hoogere Burger School) in 1925, and graduated from law school in 1932 (p. 
509). Kusuma's edition of proceedings from the constitutional convention notes that Tan eventually 
relocated to the Netherlands; see Lahirnya Undang-undang Dasar, p. 27, n. 84. More information on Tan can 
be found in Peter Post, ed., The Encyclopedia of Indonesia in the Pacific War (Leiden: Brill, 2010), p. 607. Tan is 
said to have practiced law in Batavia, serving mostly Chinese businessmen, after graduation from the 
Academy of Law (Rechts Hoogeschool). When Japan took over, his well-placed connections arranged for 
hi m to be appointed to the Japanese bureau for propaganda and he became secretary of Hua Ch'iao 
Chung Hui (Overseas Chinese Association).
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question of Indonesian citizenship would subsequently determine whether or not 
ethnic Chinese would be defined by the constitution as members of the new republic.
Proceedings from the convention tell us that, when given the opportunity to 
deliver his address, Liem Koen Hian, the Chinese representative from East Java, a 
leading journalist and founder of Partai Tionghoa Indonesia (Chinese Indonesian 
Party), proposed that Chinese people in the former Dutch East Indies be incorporated 
in the definition of Indonesian citizen.40 The Chinese people in the colony, he argued, 
were without a national identity to hinder their adoption of Indonesian nationality. In 
his view, for the historically crossbred people in China and those born and bred 
overseas, there was no such thing as "Chinese nationality" (kebangsaan Tionghoa).41 To 
him, the Chinese nation only existed in the cultural sense, and it was only in relation to 
that sense that he referred to himself as "Chinese." As if to emphasize, Liem went on to 
say that even in a cultural sense, the peranakan Chinese could no longer be called 
Chinese. The peranakan of the Netherlands Indies, he maintained, habitually called 
themselves "Chinese" only because of the lack of an appropriate label (etiket). They 
were Dutch subjects, but certainly were not Dutch people. The anticipated birth of the 
Indonesian state, in his view, was precisely the defining moment that would allow a 
proper signification—the Chinese would thereby be able to call themselves 
"Indonesian."
Speaking on behalf of his constituents, and on behalf of the entire Chinese 
community that, he said, has the propensity to "shy away from politics," Liem 
conveyed that leaders of Chinese communities in Malang, Surabaya, and Bandung had 
expressed their aspirations to him, "to pass on to the Investigative Committee that 
when the time comes to draft the Indonesian Constitution, that all Chinese be 
established as citizens of Indonesia."42 To Liem, the success of Partai Tionghoa 
Indonesia candidates as representatives of the Chinese group in the People's Council 
(Volksraad) and the Provincial Council (Provinciale Raad) elections, despite the party's 
small membership, was indicative of broad support for the party's pro-Indonesia 
politics.43 Liem's personal background, his political orientation, and especially his close 
association with leaders of the Indonesian nationalist movement made it only natural 
that he should propose including all Chinese in the definition of Indonesian citizen. In 
fact, he also indicated to the committee that a discussion of nationality (kebangsaan) was 
irrelevant and that citizenship (kewargaan) had to be based on one's residency, in which 
case the Chinese in the former colony were also "people of this country" (rakyat negeri 
ini).
The opinions of other Chinese representatives, however, differed from Liem's. In 
particular, the delegate from Central Java, Oei Tjong Hauw, pleaded that Indonesian 
citizenship not be imposed on the Chinese. He insisted that "among the Chinese 
people residing in Indonesia, there are many who retained their nationality
40 Bahar and Hudawati, eds., Risalah Sidang, pp. 187-92.
41 Liem has previously written about the fictional quality of so-called "Chinese blood" in a newspaper 
article; see Liem Koen Hian, "Darah Tionghoa," Sin Tit Po, December 2,1929.
42 Bahar and Huda wati, eds., Risalah Sidang, pp. 189—91.
43 Many Chinese wanted to join his party, Liem claimed, but were harassed by the Political Intelligence 
Service (Politieke Inlichtingendienst), because the colonial government "did not want to see Chinese and 
Indonesian people unite."
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[kerakyatan], that is, the Chinese nationality, after the abolition of the Dutch 
nationality,"44 thus essentially arguing that since the Chinese were no longer Dutch 
subjects, the impending transfer of sovereignty should not affect their national status. 
Unlike Liem, for Oei, the "Chinese" label was more than a cultural attribute; it 
represented primarily a people, thus a collective self-identification, with inherent as 
well as inherited nationalistic sentiments. It was implicit in his argument that the 
identity of the Chinese in Indonesia was not one and the same with "Indonesians," nor 
could the two be merged. Rather, he imagined the Chinese population as an extra­
national constituent, whose members would continue to live and earn their living in 
Indonesia after the transfer of sovereignty. He assured members of the committee that 
even though the Chinese might opt for Chinese nationality, they were "100 percent 
prepared to assist the Indonesian people to establish an independent state, to the best 
of [their] ability." The question of citizenship, ultimately, for him, was more than a 
matter of legality—it was a matter of "nationalistic feelings."45
The sincerity of Oei's "nationalistic feelings" for China was, however, not 
unquestionable. Oei was an heir to the sugar and shipping empire Oei Tiong Ham 
Concern of Semarang, and it is well documented that Oei's extended family was quite 
cosmopolitan when it came to national attachment. He descended from people whose 
lives were shaped by the colonial global trade—from his grandfather Oei Tjie Sien, 
who migrated to Semarang and became an importer of dried fish and exporter of tea, 
spices, sugar, and tobacco, to his father, the Chinese major and sugar magnate Oei 
Tiong Ham.4b Many descendants of Oei Tiong Ham, from eight wives, were schooled 
abroad, intermarried, and established roots outside Indonesia.47 Additionally, it was 
not uncommon for Chinese merchants during the colonial period to hold multiple 
nationalities, which worked to their advantage in terms of business networking and 
trade tariffs.48 A Chinese merchant who registered in the Japan-ruled Formosa, for 
instance, could simultaneously claim the nationalities of Taiwan, Japan, the 
Netherlands, and Great Britain. As Man-houng Lin indicates, multiple nationalities 
were possible due to the flexible nature of China's nationality law, and, in addition, the 
British nationality law did not require its holders to give up their original nationality. 
The institutions, culture, and networks of global trade in which Chinese merchants 
moved inevitably created individuals with fluid national subjectivity in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.49 It has been noted that Oei Tiong Ham liked
44 Bahar and Hudawati, eds., Risalah Sidang, pp. 213-15.
45 Ibid., p. 214.
46 Liem Tjwan Ling, Raja Gula Oei Tiong Ham (Surabaya: Liem Tjwan Ling, 1979). Liem was a proofreader 
at Soeara Publiek between 1926 and 1928, when the newspaper was headed by Liem Koen Hian.
47 Benny G. Setiono, Tionghoa dalam Pusaran Politik (Jakarta: Elkasa. 2002), pp. 249-76. In some sources, Oei 
Tiong Ham is said to have had nine wives.
48 Man-houng Lin, "Overseas Chinese Merchants and Multiple Nationality: A Means for Reducing 
Commercial Risk (1895-1935)," Modern Asian Studies 35,4 (2001): 985-1009.
9 Adam McKeown has drawn attention to the global connections, dispersions, channels, nodes, links, and 
flows related to modern Chinese migration. See his two books, Chinese Migrant Networks and Cultural 
Change: Peru, Chicago, Hawaii, 1900-1936 (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2001) and Melancholy 
Order. McKeown's discussion of the Chinese migrant elite in Peru is especially illuminating with regard to 
their cosmopolitan identity. The Chinese in Peru, he writes, "made economic accomplishment the basis for 
any social recognition" and "presented themselves to the Peruvian public not as the representatives of 
Chinese associations or the Chinese communities, but as the honorable managers of important companies 
who worked in the interests of Peru without interfering in the affairs of the people." See his Chinese
96 Elizabeth Chandra
to describe himself as a "Semarang Chinese," an identity that was simultaneously local 
and cosmopolitan, more than it was political.* 50 So it is quite likely that Oei Tjong 
Hauw's approach toward Indonesian citizenship reflected the mercantile group's 
flexible attachment to nations and nationalities more than it did his proclaimed loyalty 
to China.
It is also possible that Oei's preference for Chinese nationality was based on a 
business calculation. He was one of the founders of Chung Hwa Hui (Chinese 
Association), a party known to have a close relationship with the Dutch government in 
terms of commerce and politics.51 In spite of this, during the Japanese occupation Oei's 
business also collaborated with the Japanese authorities as a supplier for the army.52 In 
fact, commercial dealings between Mata-hari, a newspaper subsidized by Oei Tiong 
Ham Concern, and Japanese companies at the height of the second Sino-Japanese War, 
led other Indies-Chinese newspapers to charge Mata-hari with being a sellout and 
traitor.53 Additionally, from a business point of view, it is not so unexpected that Oei's 
opinion was consistent with that of the (soon to be) returning Dutch authorities, who 
sought to recover their prewar colony. Heidhues has noted that, upon returning to 
Indonesia, and in his negotiations with Indonesian leaders, Lt. Governor-General Van 
Mook pushed for a scenario of ethnic pluralism in which Dutch people—along with 
Chinese, Arab, and Eurasian residents—would form separate (alien) constituencies in 
independent Indonesia in order to retain some of their distinctive roles, preserve their 
economic interests, and protect their respective positions as recognized minorities.54 
From many indications, it appears that economic factors, rather than "nationalistic 
feelings," motivated Oei Tjong Hauw's appeal to the Investigative Committee that the 
Chinese be left to remain Chinese nationals.55
Migrant Networks, p. 137. It is easy to imagine that Oei saw his presence in and relation with Indonesia in 
just these terms, as an unintrusive foreigner. For a more specific discussion on how transnational practices 
affect (and create new) Chinese subjectivities, see Aihwa Ong and Donald M. Nonini's edited volume, 
Ungrounded Empires: The Cultural Politics of Modern Chinese Transnationalism (New York, NY: Routledge, 
1997).
50 Twang Peck Yang, The Chinese Business Elite in Indonesia and the Transition to Independence, 1940-1950 
(Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 24-26. Oei Tiong Ham's youngest son, Oei Tjong Tjay, 
however, described his father as having a nationalistic bent, being the first Chinese in the Indies to get rid 
of the Manchu-imposed pigtail; see Yoshihara Kunio, "Interview: Oei Tjong Tjay," Southeast Asian Studies 
27,2 (September 1988): 221-65. A short journalistic novel by TanMoh Goan, Doenia Terbalik ...? ! (Tjilik 
Roman's 12, November 1949), gives a survey of Chinese communities displaced by acts of violence at the 
beginning of the Japanese occupation. Among those affected is the Chinese population in Semarang, 
where "Mr. Oei T. H." donates a sum of /75,000 to a local relief organization and mobilizes employees of 
his firm to assist with the relief work. The company "O. T. H. Concern," we are told, also donates /50,000. 
Regardless of the factuality of Tan's account, one should not doubt that Oei Tiong Ham or Oei Tjong 
Hauw had fellow feelings for the Chinese in the Indies.
51 Suryadinata, Peranakan Chinese Politics in Java, 1917-1942.
52 Yang, The Chinese Business Elite, pp. 86-91.
53 "Polemik Mata-hari dan Sin Tit Po," Sin Tit Po, May 8,1939.
54 Heidhues, "Citizenship and Identity," p. 118.
55 In this regard, Oei was an early subscriber to what Aihwa Ong describes as "flexible citizenship," the 
selective and circumstantial association with nation-states based less on the notion of duty and political 
participation than on a calculation of benefits. Ong writes, "Although citizenship is conventionally 
thought of as based on political rights and participation within a sovereign state, globalization has made 
economic calculation a major element in diasporan subjects' choice of citizenship"; see Aihwa Ong, Flexible 
Citizenship: The Cultural Logics ofTransnationalitp (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1999), p. 112.
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The delegate from West Java, Oei Tiang Tjoei, concurred with Oei Tjong Hauw in 
many respects. Regardless of where they live, he declared, Chinese people harbor 
nationalistic feelings and such feelings are quite natural. Even though they have lived 
in the Indian archipelago for generations, the Chinese, like other people, "shall hold 
firmly onto the nationality [they] were born with."5b In fact, Oei Tiang Tjoei saw the 
parallels between China's and Indonesia's movements for independence, and, like Oei 
Tjong Hauw, pledged wholehearted support for the birth of the Republic of 
Indonesia.'7 He proposed therefore, that, if it should happen that Chinese people were 
incorporated into Indonesian citizenship, they must also be granted the opportunity to 
make individual decisions to retain their Chinese nationality.
There is not much biographical information available on Oei Tiang Tjoei that 
would enable us to expand on his position. He was the director of Hong Po and its 
successor, Rung Yung Pao (Malay edition), which were known to be pro-Japan— 
especially the latter, which was among a few newspapers allowed to publish during 
the Japanese occupation. His close connection with the Japanese authorities in 
Indonesia, as in the case of Oei Tjong Hauw, undoubtedly put him in a position to 
become one of the forty-three members of the Central Advisory Council (Chuo Sangi- 
in), and, subsequently, of the Investigative Committee. What is clear about Oei was his 
antipathy toward the Dutch government in the Indies, and to a certain extent all the 
colonial powers in Asia.56 78 He seems to identify more with Indonesia than with China,59 60
and in his memoir he castigated what he called "five-and-dime" (klontong) Chinese 
nationalists in Indonesia who nonetheless capitulated and became spies for the Dutch 
government. In his eyes, such Chinese were in effect "traitors to fellow Asian 
nations."80 It appears that he spoke in his capacity as representative of the Chinese 
population when referring to the Chinese immutable ethno-nationality;61 he was head 
of Hua Ch'iao Chung Hui (Overseas Chinese Association), the only association of its 
kind sanctioned by the Japanese authorities.
56 Bahar and Hudawati, eds., Risalah Sidang, p. 213.
57 Oei was referring to China's sovereignty being infringed upon by Western powers, not to the annexation 
of its territories by Japan. His pro-Japan stance and close association with the occupying authorities 
certainly confirmed this.
58 Between 1941 and 1942, Oei was detained by the Dutch government because the newspaper under his 
management, Hong Po, was a vocal supporter of Japan and critical of the colonial government. In his 
memoir he wrote of his experience as a political prisoner from December 8,1941, until the arrival of the 
Japanese army in Cilacap in March 1942. See Oey [sic] Tiang Tjoei, Pengalaman Kita dalam Pengasingnn 
Gnroet-Soekaboemi dan Noesakambangan (Tjilatjap) (Djakarta: Hong Po, 1942). In the memoir, the Malay name 
for Dutch ("belanda") is always printed in lowercase.
59 This is what was puzzling about Oei's politics. Back in 1942, in the same memoir, he wrote rather 
passionately about Indonesia. When faced with the possibility of being exiled overseas, outside the 
Netherlands Indies, Oei wrote that he and other detainees were ready to resist, "to shed blood to water 
Indonesia's seeds of independence, so that it [would] soon be free from dutch [sic] oppressive power," and 
that they "would rather die in Indonesia, where they were born [and] raised." See Oey, Pengalaman Kita, p. 
42.
60 Oey, Pengalaman Kita, p. 25.
61 This view of ethnic nationalism—that one is born into a nation and is forever stamped by it—was shared 
by the Chinese consul New Shu Chun, who later remarked, "With regard to citizenship, it is up to the 
Chinese people [in Indonesia] to choose, but whatever [their choice] and wherever [they are], Chinese 
people are always Chinese." See "5000 Pengoengsi Tionghoa Ingin Kombali ka Djokja," Sin Po, August 8, 
1949, p. 1.
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Needless to say, it seemed natural for both Oei Tiang Tjoei and Oei Tjong Hauw to 
imagine the Chinese and Indonesians as two distinct national groups. Unlike Liem, 
whose concept of "Chinese" was rather exceptional, Oei Tiang Tjoei did not perceive 
the potential inclusion of Chinese people into Indonesian citizenship as a form of or 
process toward nationalization. The naturalization process, if it occurred at all, was to 
be in the legal sense only, and not in the cultural or biological sense (in which ethnic 
Chinese would be assimilated into the local environment in order to become more like 
Indonesians). So to him, impending Indonesian citizenship, at best, was no more than a 
legal attribute—not unlike the other nationalities that overseas Chinese customarily 
adopted—and by no means would it diminish their filial bond with "the nationality 
they were born with." Such a conception of citizenship—a formal (legal) attribute that 
does not entail substantive integration—in retrospect, is precisely what the Chinese 
were accorded in post-colonial Indonesia. The difference, however, is that today such 
artificial inclusion is condemned by the Chinese as a form of discrimination.
To be sure, there were misgivings about incorporating the Chinese into Indonesian 
citizenship.62 63As Oei Tjong Hauw indicated in his address, a number of Indonesian 
leaders suspected that some Chinese did not want to become Indonesian citizens 
because they looked down on this status. He dismissed this suspicion as false, but the 
perception was not without historical basis. It is well documented that throughout the 
colonial period, the Chinese tirelessly pressed for equal status (gelijkstelling) alongside 
Europeans and Japanese, which would distinguish them further from the natives 
(inlanders) who occupied the bottom of the social hierarchy. In 1919, the Netherlands 
Indies government relented by making the European civil code applicable to Indies- 
born Chinese (except for inheritance and family laws), with a promise that they would 
be granted equal legal standing with Europeans and Japanese in due course. With 
regard to criminal law, it had long been a source of grievance and taken as an insult by 
the Chinese that they were subjected to the same regulations as the indigenous people 
and were tried in "native courts" by a native judge (djaksa).b3J h e  promise of equality 
with Europeans never quite materialized in part due to lack of funding for new 
courts—as the Chinese population was five times larger than that of the Europeans— 
and concerns that it might trigger resentment from the indigenous population.
Another dynamic in the citizenship debate was the Japanese political program in 
Indonesia. It should be noted that the kind of extra-national residential status defined 
for ethnic Chinese in Indonesia, as anticipated by Oei Tjong Hauw, was not without a 
political context. The Investigative Committee and the 1945 Constitution that 
committee produced were conditioned by a specific political circumstance—the 
Japanese occupation and its design for the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. In 
the blueprint of Greater East Asia, formerly colonized nations in Southeast Asia, in 
addition to China and Manchukuo, would form a special bond as "a family of nations"
62 See especially the speech by Wongsonagoro in Bahar and Hudawati, eds., Risalah Sidang, p. 192; see also 
the 1934 polemics on whether peranakan Chinese were Indonesians: Leo Suryadinata, Peranakan's Search for 
National Identity: Biographical Studies of Seven Indonesian Chinese (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1993).
63 Amry Vandenbosch, The Dutch East Indies: Its Government, Problems, and Politics (Berkeley, CA:
University of California Press, 1941), pp. 24-25, 364-65. See also Kwee Tek Hoay, "Gelijkstelling Bagi 
Bangsa Tionghoa," Panorama 29, July 2,1927; and Lohanda, Growing Pains, pp. 92-106.
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under Japan's leadership.64 At the end of the Pacific War, Oei Tjong Hauw envisioned 
all Asians, regardless of nationality, would be equal, liberated, and prosperous. Oei 
Tiang Tjoei, too, considered the political context when he proposed flexibility for the 
Chinese to decide on their national status "in accordance with international rules, in 
order to unite for the common interests of the Greater East Asia." So the flexibility with 
which these Chinese delegates approached the question of Indonesian citizenship was 
grounded not solely on the proclaimed inherent bond with Chinese nationality, but 
also on the impression that both Indonesia and China might someday soon be 
members of a united Greater East Asia community.65
These choices and political dynamics, rather than the history of hostility among 
ethnic Chinese and indigenous groups in the Indies, are what factored into the legal 
distinction between "indigenous" and "non-indigenous" Indonesians. It certainly was 
not lost on Wongsonagoro,66 a representative from East Java, that some Chinese might 
not wish to be classified as "indigenous residents" (penduduk asli), a status that would 
automatically convert them into "citizens" upon Indonesia's independence. 67 
Essentially, he observed, members of the Investigative Committee saw the alternatives 
of residency in independent Indonesia in binary terms—"indigenous" or "alien."68 But 
he deemed this categorization too extreme, so he proposed instead a new, third 
category in-between indigenous and alien—a special residential status. The special 
status, he elaborated, was to be designated for "our brothers and sisters who are not 
indigenous, nor alien, but of our fellow Greater East Asian nations." In his judgment, 
this special category was not only congruent with the principles of co-prosperity, but 
also constructive in promoting mutual trust among the nations involved. In fact, in 
drawing up a constitution, members of the committee were rather timid, if not 
hesitant, in taking steps to "nationalize" people of other nationalities, as committee 
members did not wish to be perceived as disrespectful of other sovereignties.69 
Moreover, it is worth noting that in Wongsonagoro's proposal, indigeneity is more of a 
temporal indicator than a racial marker, in which case all those who established 
residency prior to Indonesia's independence would automatically acquire citizenship. 
Thus, it appears from his remarks that the Chinese were not to be classified as 
"indigenous" (asli) as a way to exclude them, but rather to acknowledge their self- 
identification as non-Indonesians.
64 As delegate Parada Harahap remarked, "[T]he Indonesian state that we are about to establish is one 
member of the Greater East Asian family"; see Kusuma, Lahirnya Undang-undang Dasar, p. 264.
65 As this convention took place after Japan had lost the Philippines and Burma to the Allied Forces and 
was increasingly on the defensive, it was also possible that Oei Tjong Hauw was anticipating the return of 
the Dutch government, in which case the Chinese population's elite position relative to the "natives" 
could simply be restored.
66 Wongsonagoro was the Regent of Sragen, an adjudicator for the Solo royal court, head of the Boedi 
Oetomo branch in Solo and of Jong Java (Young Java), and co-founder of Indonesia Moeda (Young 
Indonesia); see Gunseikanbu, Orang Indonesia, p. 113.
67 Bahar and Hudawati, eds., Risalah Sidang, pp. 192-95.
65 A similar sentiment was expressed in the first phase of the convention between May 29 and June 1,1945. 
As delegate Soesanto Ti rtoprodjo summed it up in his speech, "[I]n the system of government of Free 
Indonesia, there will be only two kinds of residents: Indonesian nationals and foreign nationals." What he 
meant by "Indonesian nationals" were those who were "normally referred to as Indonesians," as well as 
residents who "truly felt [themselves] to be solely Indonesian." See Kusuma, Lahirnya Undang-undang 
Dasar, p. 111.
69 See in particular Soepomo's argument in Bahar and Hudawati, eds., Risalah Sidang, pp. 326-27.
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To his credit, Liem Koen Hian tried to dispel the classification of Indonesians based 
on indigeneity and ethnicity. As early as 1930, he had promoted the concept of 
"Indonesianship" (Indonesiarschap), which defined the Indonesian nation as inclusive of 
all people who regarded the Netherlands Indies as their homeland.7" As a leftist, in his 
writings he underscored the merits of looking at the question of nationality in 
independent Indonesia through the prism of class. He argued, for instance, that the 
wide-ranging Chinese attitudes toward Indonesian citizenship were motivated by class 
differences. As far as Chinese people were concerned, he wrote just before the 
Investigative Committee convened, they did not constitute a cohesive unit. "The 
Chinese communities are composed of various social strata. Each social stratum has its 
own interests, and sometimes they are contradictory to one another."70 1 Chinese 
business people have conflicts of interest with Chinese clientele, he offered, and the 
latter may have more in common with the Indonesian labor class than with their 
wealthy compatriots. Against the prevalent view that tended to conflate the Chinese 
ethnic with material privilege, Liem tried to draw a distinction along class lines in 
order to bring together the majority of Chinese and Indonesians. Moreover, perhaps in 
anticipation of Oei Tjong Hauw's rejection of Indonesian citizenship, his argument 
implied that Chinese individuals from the entrepreneurial class could not be said to be 
speaking for Chinese people in general, who presumably were from the (lower) 
laboring class. These Chinese, he insisted, have much more in common with 
Indonesians.
From the point of view of some committee members, as a matter of fact, the marker 
"indigenous" conflicted with the very nature of the Indonesian Constitution.72 
Sukardjo Wirjopranoto more specifically argued that cultivating the distinction 
between indigenous and non-indigenous citizens projected an image of fragmentation, 
which only undermined Indonesia's advocacy of unity and its rationale for 
independence. He proposed that the modifier "indigenous" be deleted from the draft 
"to avoid disagreement," in which case "the citizens" would be defined minimally as 
"the people of Indonesia and those who at the time of inauguration (pelantikan) [of 
independence] have resided in Indonesia."73 The representative of Dutch-Eurasians, P.
70 Since the late 1920s, Liem had conceptualized an Indies-based national status for the Chinese called 
"Indisch burgerschap" (Indies citizenship). According to journalist Kwee Thiam Tjing, this concept was 
endorsed and given the simplified term "Indonesierschap" in the 1930s by Liem's close friend, the 
nationalist leader Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo. See Liem Koen Hian, "Ka-Indonesierschap," Sin Tit Po, April 
2,1930; see also Liem's article written under the pseudonym "Medewerker" (Employee), "Apa Baba Bisa 
Menjadi Indonesier?" Mata-hari, September 8,1934.
71 As cited in Yang, The Chinese Business, p. 125.
72 The 1945 Constitution also stipulates that the president of Indonesia has to be an indigenous citizen.
(Had the modifier "indigenous" been omitted from the definition of citizen, one could only speculate 
about the presidential proviso.) In the draft constitution, being a Muslim was another prerequisite, but 
that was dropped after spirited debates and as a concession to delegates from Christian-majority regions.
73 See Bahar and Hudawati, eds., Risalnh Sidang, pp. 341, 344. There seems to be a crucial error in Kusuma's 
edition of Yamin's remark on this particular point. When Yamin recited the "revision of [his] suggestion" 
{redaksi daripada usul saya) for the article on citizen, he removed the word "asli" (indigenous) to take into 
account Wirjopranoto's proposal. In Kusuma's book, the word "asli" remains, thus nothing was redacted; 
see Lahirnya Undang-undang Dnsnr, p. 400. The word "asli" is omitted in Yamin's own edition of transcripts 
from the constitutional convention, Nnskah Persiapan Undang-undang Dasar 1945: Disiarkan Dengan Dibubuhi 
Tjatatan, Vol. 1 (Djakarta: Jajasan Prapantja, 1959), p. 355. Yamin has been accused of embellishing his role 
in the constitutional convention and of tampering with the proceedings to reflect this. However, taking
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F. Dahler, went further, proposing that the committee bypass the difficult delineation 
of "citizen" by relegating it altogether to legislative acts (undang-undang), and thereby 
shifting it outside the constitution (undang-undang dasar), after the transfer of 
sovereignty. This proposal was initially endorsed by Soepomo and Yamin, but both 
retracted their endorsements for the sake of technical clarity (regarding who "the 
Indonesians" were) at the time of independence.74
Committee members representing Dutch-Eurasian and Arab constituents were 
unequivocal in their aspirations for Indonesian citizenship. The representative of the 
Arab group, A. R. Baswedan, was especially adamant that this status must be 
acknowledged in the constitution.75 In the case of Arabs, he explained, the process of 
integration was far less complicated than for the Chinese, as Arab people in the Indies 
did not share a common national origin; at the time there was no single Arab state 
equivalent to the Republic of China. What's more, Baswedan elaborated, most Arabs 
had intermarried with indigenous people in the Indies. Thus, as a stateless group, they 
were disinclined to give their allegiance to any other country, and as an assimilated 
group, they were prepared to become citizens of the new nation.76
Thus, the sticking point in the debate was the difference of opinion among the 
Chinese delegates. As Baswedan made clear, the Chinese groups' divided positions 
"had put the committee in a bind," which thus threatened to nullify the Arab group's 
desire to be naturalized as Indonesian citizens.77 Because the Chinese represented a 
larger constituency than the Eurasian, Arab, or Indian populations in Indonesia, they 
had a bigger sway in this matter. Taking into consideration Oei Tjong Hauw's remarks 
that, like the Indonesians, Chinese people also had nationalistic feelings, the main 
architect of the constitution, Soepomo, considered it "imperative" that the committee 
"respect" the Chinese feelings by not heedlessly naturalizing residents of foreign 
descent (kaum peranakan).78
The result of the long debate was a compromise. "Because of the disagreement 
among the Chinese groups," Soekarno said later, summing up the situation, "the 
Investigative Committee adopted a [special] clause" consigning the national status of 
residents of foreign descent to be determined by legislative acts. 9 Acts, Soepomo 
explained, were flexible and easy to amend, unlike the constitution.80 While Oei Tjong 
Hauw must have been pleased with this decision, Liem Koen Hian resigned in protest,
into consideration Wirjopranoto's proposal to delete the word "asli" does not affect his reputation 
positively or negatively.
74 They were taken aback by this question from delegate Soetardjo Kartohadikoesoemo, "[B]efore there are 
legislative acts, who then are the citizens?" The concern was that if the citizens were not defined at the 
time of the proclamation of independence, some Indonesians might think they were still Dutch subjects. 
See Bahar and Hudawati, eds., Risalah Sidang, pp. 344-46.
75 Ibid., p. 337.
76 Ibid., pp. 337-40.
77 Ibid., p. 340.
78 Ibid., pp. 326-27.
79 Kusuma, Lahimya Undang-undang Dasar, p. 527.
80 Ibid., p. 387.
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stating that it was inappropriate for him as an "alien national" to be in the Indonesian 
constitutional committee.81
In regards to political representation, the legitimacy of the Investigative Committee 
was questionable. It was assembled during the Japanese occupation, and its members 
were appointed by the occupying authorities. Additionally, it comprised 
representatives from only Java and the island of Madura, which were administered by 
the Japanese Sixteenth Army.82 The eastern part of Indonesia was under the authority 
of the Japanese Navy and therefore did not have a delegation.83 After Japan 
surrendered, the Committee for the Preparation of Indonesia's Independence (Panitia 
Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia), sixteen of whose twenty-seven members also 
served on the Investigative Committee, in addition to delegations from eastern 
Indonesia, Bali, and Sumatra, finalized the draft constitution and sanctioned it one day 
after the declaration of independence. In the concluding session of the constitutional 
deliberations, except for references to the formal position of Islam in the state,84 for the 
most part the draft prepared by the Investigative Committee remained unaltered, 
including the articles on citizenship.
Hence, when the 1945 Constitution went into effect, it defined Indonesian citizens 
as "persons who are indigenous Indonesians and persons of [another] nationality who 
become citizens by way of law."85 Within a year, the Law on Citizenship and the 
Population of Indonesia (UU No. 3, 1946, then amended with UU No. 6, 1947) 
expanded this definition into
(a) persons who are native to the territory of the Indonesian nation; (b) persons 
not included in the aforementioned group but descended from a person of that 
group, who were born and reside within the jurisdiction of the Indonesian state, 
and persons who are not descendants of the aforementioned group but were born 
and have resided for at least the last five consecutive years in the jurisdiction of 
the Indonesian state, who are at least twenty-one years of age or have married.
81 He resigned on the final day of the Investigative Committee convention, July 16 ,1945, when the draft 
constitution was accepted by acclamation; ibid., p. 455.
82 Members of the Investigative Committee, however, drafted the 1945 Constitution with the assumption 
that the new state would, at minimum, comprise the territory of the former Dutch East Indies; see Bahar 
and Hudawati, eds., Risalnh Sidang, pp. 66-82,178-80. In his speech on July 10, Yamin remarked that the 
Investigative Committee convention was "representative of the people" because the delegates "originated 
from the island of Sumatra, the island of Borneo, from Java, from Sulawesi, from Ambon," such that they 
"could deliberate in the way of the people and for the people"; ibid., p. 229.
83 Sumatra was under the Twenty-fifth Army and had its own less active investigative committee that, in 
the end, proved inconsequential; see Benedict R. O'G. Anderson, Some Aspects of Indonesian Politics under 
the Japanese Occupation: 1944 -^1945 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1961).
84 For more information on this, see R. E. Elson, "Another Look at the Jakarta Charter Controversy of 
1945," Indonesia 88 (October 2009): 105-30.
85 Chapter X, Article 26,1. The wording reverted to what was written in the so-called Undang-undang Dasar 
Sementara (Provisional Constitution), submitted by the Husein Djajadiningrat group on June 15,1945; see 
Kusuma, Lahirnya Undang-undang Dasar, p. 194. Soepomo, along with A. Soebardjo and A. Maramis, as 
early as 1942, had drafted Rencana Permulaan dari Undang-undang Dasar Negara Indonesia (Preliminary Draft 
of the Constitution of the Indonesian State), in which "the conditions necessary for being an Indonesian 
citizen" were written simply as "to be determined by law"; see Kusuma, Lahirnya Undang-undang Dasar, 
pp. 562, 571. "Citizen" in this 1942 draft is still referred to as "rakyat" (the people), not "warga negara" 
(literally, "member of the state").
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In the 1947 revision, the repudiation clause (Article 3a) was added, stating that an 
"Indonesian citizen who also holds citizenship [in another] state can relinquish his/her 
Indonesian citizenship with a declaration of objection." This declaration was to be 
submitted in writing to the Minister of Justice within one year after the law went into 
effect.
Despite Oei Tjong Hauw's proposition to let the Chinese in Indonesia remain 
citizens of China, and the viewpoints of Chinese delegates of Central and West Java 
that ethnic Chinese constituted a separate nationality and could (or should) not be 
expected to shed their ancestral bond with China, the first nationality law was defined 
broadly enough to include ethnic Chinese and to accommodate individual aspirations 
to retain Chinese (or other foreign) nationality and refuse Indonesian citizenship 
should one wish to do so.
It cannot be denied that in the early years of the Republic, the 1945 Constitution 
was on rather tenuous footing. Within months after the constitution was sanctioned, 
the Republican government was forced to desert Jakarta and relocate to Yogyakarta by 
the Allied Forces. And due to factionalism in the central leadership, and because he 
had been tainted by his collaboration with the Japanese, as early as November 1945 
Soekarno had to relinquish much of his executive power to a parliamentary system to 
accommodate the different factions and (later on) political parties.86 For less than a year 
after the transfer of sovereignty on December 27, 1949, when Indonesia was officially a 
federation of the original Republic along with fifteen other Dutch-formed states, the 
country was governed by the 1949 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Indonesia 
(Konstitusi RIS), in which citizenship is simply defined as being "determined by federal 
laws." When the federal states voluntarily or by coercion merged into the unitary 
Republic of Indonesia on August 15, 1950, the 1950 Provisional Constitution (Undang- 
unhang Dasar Sementara) was sanctioned and the article on citizenship remained, except 
for the word "federal." The Provisional Constitution was supposed to remain in effect 
until an elected assembly could draft a more representative one.87 The first national 
election was held in 1955, but the subsequent constitutional assembly experienced 
gridlock and settled nothing, even though more than half of the assembly members 
favored a return to the 1945 Constitution. Later it was reimplemented by way of a 
presidential decree, on July 5,1959.
Thus, regardless of the way the term "indigenous" was to be politicized, the 
preliminary definition of "citizen" was hardly discriminatory. Even Donald Willmott, 
who wrote extensively on the national status of ethnic Chinese in Indonesia, appears to 
have missed the entirety of the dynamics behind the constitutional deliberations on 
citizenship, devoting no more than two pages to it in his book The National Status of the 
Chinese in Indonesia, 1900-1958. In reality, the definition of citizen in the 1945 
Constitution and in the subsequent nationality law is quite generous, as it reflects 
ample goodwill on the part of the nationalist leaders and their close relationship with 
leaders of the Chinese community. Tjoa Sik Ien, the pre-war chairman of Partai
86 Benedict R. O'G. Anderson, Java in a Time of Revolution: Occupation and Resistance, 1944-1946 (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1972); I. D. Legge, Sukarno: A Political Biography (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1972), 
pp. 149-278.
s' M. C. Rieklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1981), pp. 200- 
21.
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Tionghoa Indonesia, director of the newspaper Sin Tit Po, and self-proclaimed 
supporter of the Indonesian independence movement, wrote of the inclusionary 
disposition and the democratic quality of Indonesia's first nationality law. In an essay 
he wrote, "[The Indonesian nationality law] is very different from the Netherlands 
Indies government which made all Indies-Chinese Netherlands subjects without 
asking whether or not they wanted the status. The attitude of the Chinese government 
was like that of the Dutch, as in the agreement between the Dutch and the Chinese in 
Beijing in 1911, they declared nationality for all overseas Chinese without first asking 
the opinion of those concerned."88
The Chinese may have harbored reservations about being deemed "Indonesian" 
not only because that status struck some of them as inferior, but also because they had 
experienced recurring hostility from (other) Indonesian groups during the 
revolutionary period. Scores of journalistic accounts of outbreaks of anti-Chinese 
violence in cities like Tangerang, Malang, Surabaya, Palembang, and Bagansiapiapi— 
ranging from vandalism, assault, to killings—undoubtedly gave some Chinese second 
thoughts about joining the national fraternity of Indonesia.89 The assaults, of course, 
stemmed from long-held indigenous resentment over the perceived arrogance 
attributed to some Chinese, as well as resentment of the roles the Chinese had played 
as middlemen in the colonial economic structure, where a number operated as opium 
and revenue farmers and retail traders. Given the reputation of the Chinese, many 
people assumed that they would prefer to collaborate with those seeking the return of 
the Dutch. Some estimate that one thousand Chinese were killed in Surabaya alone; 
but the number is relatively small compared with Indonesian casualties from the 
turbulent years in that battlefront city.90 The heavy toll exacted by the revolution—of 
Indonesians who fell to the Allied Forces and to the Japanese military caretakers when 
defending the young Republic—and, conversely, the general lack of any Chinese 
contribution to the independence effort, in the eyes of the Indonesian public, could not 
but undermine any future Chinese claim of belonging.91
In the subsequent years, while many Chinese were resigned to a wait-and-see 
attitude, there were those who exercised the right to remain Chinese nationals.
88 Tjoa Sik Ien, Masa'alah Warga Negara Indonesia (Jogjakarta: [s.n.], 1946), pp. 20-26. In his translation, Leo 
Suryadinata used the words "citizen" and "citizenship," although, in this case, it appears that Tjoa was 
talking about "subject" and the Dutch "subjecthood"; see Suryadinata, Political Thinking of the Indonesian 
Chinese, p. 176.
89 See, for instance, accounts by Kwee Thiam Tjing (under the pseudonym Tjamboek Berdoeri), Indonesia 
Dalem Api dan Bara (Malang: Perfectas, 1947); Kwee KekBeng, Doea Poeloe Lima Tahon Sebagai Wartawan, 
1922 / 947 (Batavia: Kuo, 1948); and the aforementioned journalistic novel by Tan Moh Goan, Doenia 
Terbalik...?!
90 In a footnote, William H. Frederick quotes A. H. Nasution's estimation of casualties as "tens of thousand 
dead and wounded" on the Indonesian side and a Dutch figure of eight thousand dead; see Frederick, 
Visions and Heat: The Making of the Indonesian Revolution (Athens, OFF Ohio University Press, 1989), p. 288, 
n. 6.
91 Frederick's account of Surabaya during the revolutionary years noted that some Chinese tried to profit 
from this period of chaos, taking possession of deserted homes with Dutch approval; ibid., p. 281. It is also 
worth noting that in the two arguably most detailed studies of the Indonesian revolution—Anderson's 
Java in a Time of Revolution and Frederick's Visions and Heat—references to "Chinese" almost always occur 
alongside references to "Dutch" and "Eurasians." No doubt this is because, from the perspective of the 
revolutionary activists and Indonesians at large, the Chinese were not distinguishable from the Dutch 
politically, and their fate rose and fell with the fates of these other colonial cohorts.
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Willmott noted, however, that their actual number remained a mystery, while 
"unofficial reports gave a wide range of estimates." For instance, Badan 
Permusjawaratan Kewarganegaraan Indonesia (Consultative Body for Indonesian 
Citizenship, BAPERKI), a Chinese organization in favor of integration with Indonesia, 
gave a figure of no more than 10 percent, while an estimate from Peking claimed that 
more than half of about two million Chinese in Indonesia had chosen Chinese 
citizenship and repudiated Indonesian citizenship.92 Government sources in Indonesia 
gave unofficial estimates of about 30 percent, but Willmott also observed that "the 
Courts in many areas were exceedingly slow in 'processing' the declarations of 
repudiation." The Indonesian minister of justice finally ordered the termination of this 
processing on January 1, 1958, which means "many cases of repudiation were never 
officially certified."93
In Willmott's view, most of the Chinese who rejected Indonesian citizenship 
belonged to the group that was loyal to the People's Republic of China. In light of the 
civil war in China, pro-Kuomintang Chinese who were born in Indonesia did not reject 
Indonesian citizenship after 1950, because doing so would put them under the 
jurisdiction of Communist Chinese consuls. In the end, all these conflicting responses 
to Indonesian citizenship—so aptly represented in 1945 by the Chinese delegates to the 
Investigative Committee convention—underscored the distinctions among ethnic 
Chinese who were leaning variously towards Indonesia, China, and Taiwan; among 
members of the entrepreneurial and labor classes, as Liem Koen Hian argued; among 
those from peranakan and totok cultural backgrounds; and among those with diverse 
political outlooks. It is worth repeating here what has been said about the diversity of 
the so-called "Chinese," that they came to the archipelago at different times from 
different provinces, spoke different languages, moved in different networks, and 
settled in different grooves. They were pulled towards different identities at different 
times—as Chinese sojourners, colonial subjects, and new citizens—eventually 
identifying themselves as Indonesians, but they did so at different speeds.94 95In 
retrospect, 1945 was the beginning of what (until now at least) would be the most 
dramatic identity shift, that is, the shift to become citizens in the era of nation-states/"
Yet, this episode of history—marked by the Chinese's mixed responses to 
Indonesian citizenship—has rarely been considered and discussed. Chinese- 
Indonesians are more inclined to focus on their politically marginal status, the 
continuing practices of discrimination, and their lasting pursuit for substantive 
inclusion. The dominance of exclusionary discourse has made it almost impossible,
92 Willmott, The National Status of the Chinese, p. 68.
93 Willmott wrote, "The Government published official lists of persons who had repudiated Indonesian 
citizenship, but these were far from complete. Up until 1954 they included only 24,192 Chinese names. 
Unofficial repudiation figures for various localities appeared in the press, however. By comparing these 
with population statistics from various sources, [Willmott] estimates the following local percentages of 
Indonesian-born Chinese who repudiated their Indonesian citizenship: Djakarta, 25 percent; Jogjakarta,
25 percent; Surakarta, 20 percent; and Semarang, 10 percent." Ibid., pp. 68-69.
94 J. A. C. Mackie describes the diversity of the Chinese in Southeast Asia in these terms; see his 
introduction to Sojourners and Settlers, pp. xiii, xxvii.
95 The irony here is that the nineteenth-century creolized Chinese who resinicized themselves to become 
respectable Chinese nationals must not have thought that their descendants would eventually be forced to 
reverse these changes in order to be accepted as Indonesian nationals. This only points to the malleability 
of national identity and substantiates what Liem Koen Hian had maintained back in the 1940s.
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and perhaps politically unbearable, for the Chinese to talk about their inconsistent 
past. Chinese-Indonesian intellectuals are far more comfortable talking about Liem 
Koen Hian, or others like him, who were involved in or contributed to the birth of the 
nation or to other nationalist causes. The Chinese protagonist in Remy Sylado's 
popular 1999 novel, Cabaukan, was well received precisely for his heroic act in covertly 
assisting the Indonesian revolutionary fighters. On the other hand, the Chinese would 
rather forget about Oei Tjong Hauw's and Oei Tiang Tjoei's courteous refusal to give 
up "the nationality they were born with," as well as, for that matter, their assumption 
that Chinese people will always remain a separate national constituent in Indonesia.
One explanation for this is selective memory. The concept of Chineseness as 
perceived by Oei Tiang Tjoei and Oei Tjong Hauw, particularly their skepticism with 
regard to integration with Indonesians, has not been given proper accounting by 
Chinese-Indonesian intellectuals, which in turn accounts for the historical amnesia. In 
contrast, Liem Koen Hian's dedication to Indonesia and his unambiguous political 
stance have become legendary. No less than esteemed student-activist Soe Hok Gie 
and veteran scholar Leo Suryadinata wrote about Liem.96 Despite his much talked 
about disenchantment and eventual rejection of Indonesian citizenship, many pages of 
books and blogs have been devoted to Liem's career, his political thinking, his 
participation in the Indonesian nationalist movement, and, finally, his bitter falling out 
with the Indonesian authorities—he was detained for his leftist activities in 1951 and 
died in Medan as an alien national two years after Indonesia's independence was 
formally recognized.97 Liem's views and politics correspond well with the principles of 
assimilation in post-independence Indonesia, and with the seemingly endless struggle 
by the Chinese for inclusion. Editorial annotations of the official publication of the 
Investigative Committee proceedings portray Liem as politically inconsistent, and his 
eventual adoption of Chinese citizenship as the revelation of his true national 
allegiance.98 Even the Indonesian constitutional historian A. B. Kusuma, whose 2004 
edition Lahirnya Undang-undang Dasar 1945 (The birth of the 1945 Constitution) is 
arguably the most comprehensive source on the subject, identifies Liem as among 
"those who rejected Indonesian citizenship" because "it turns out that he died in 1952 
as a citizen of the People's Republic of China."99 Today's Chinese-Indonesians can 
easily identify with Liem's story and project on him their own narratives of 
disappointment and rejection as citizens in Indonesia.
96 Soe Hok Gie, "Liem Koen Hian dan Perdjuangan Pembinaan Bangsa," Bara Eka 6, July-August 1965, pp. 
6-11; Leo Suryadinata, "The Search for National Identity of an Indonesian Chinese: A Political Biography 
of Liem Koen Hian," Archipel 14 (1977): 43-70. Recent republication of writings by Kwee Thiam Tjing, 
Liem's friend and junior colleague, has renewed interest in Liem's story; see Tjamboek Berdoeri, Indonesia 
Dalem Api dan Bara (Jakarta: Elkasa, 2004) and Arief Djati and Benedict R. O. G. Anderson, eds., Mendjadi 
Tjamboek Berdoeri: Mernoar Kwee Thiam Tjing (Jakarta: Komunitas Bambu, 2010).
97 Still troubled by a communist rebellion in 1948, in mid-August 1951 the Sukiman (prime minister) 
government arrested many left-wing activists, including Liem. He was released in October, but was quite 
i 11 and disillusioned by the Indonesian government, such that he renounced his Indonesian citizenship 
soon after; see Suryadinata, Peranakan's Search for National Identity, pp. 74-79. See also the letter from Tjoa 
Tjie Liang, another former colleague of Liem, to Soe Hok Gie, dated July 5, 1965, explaining why Liem, 
"who had spent most of his life for the nationalist cause," abandoned Indonesian citizenship out of 
frustration; see Soe, "Liem Koen Hian."
98 Bahar and Hudawati, eds., Risalah Sidang, p. 480.
99 See Kusuma, Lahirnya Undang-undang Dasar, p. 27, n. 84.
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Such selective recollection is arguably a form of Chinese self-censorship regarding 
narratives that are at odds with their political stance today. If this particular episode of 
history—the Chinese ambivalence towards Indonesian citizenship—has become 
unrecognizable, it is because the Chinese themselves have evolved quite significantly 
since the time of independence, no doubt prodded in no small way by the state. As the 
Indonesian state became increasingly consolidated and more confident, Chinese 
ambivalence towards Indonesian citizenship became increasingly intolerable. 
Willmott's study shows that from the late 1950s, legislation influencing citizenship was 
designed to isolate gradually citizens of China who continued to reside in Indonesia, 
inadvertently alienating ethnic Chinese as a whole. Citing Hsin Pao in 1957, Willmott 
observed that it had become "more and more disadvantageous to be an alien Chinese 
in Indonesia," and that "a large number of those who had rejected their Indonesian 
citizenship in the option period 1949-1951 began to regret it."100 Meanwhile, those who 
had intended to return to China, and thus did not choose Indonesian citizenship, were 
likely to have done so during the political turmoils of 1959 and 1965.101 Following the 
1959 incident, in particular, in which the government barred alien Chinese retailers 
from rural areas, an estimated 136,000 Chinese are said to have repatriated.102 A similar 
exodus, albeit smaller in size, took place during the anti-communist campaign between 
1965 and 1967103when, after a failed coup attempt tied to the Communist Party, an 
anti-communist, anti-China US-backed regime took power. In this political 
atmosphere, the Chinese came to be seen as a communist fifth column, and both citizen 
and alien Chinese were indiscriminately targeted for harassment, intimidation, 
extortion, and vandalism.104 After the new regime was securely in power, however, the 
specter of communism and of the ethnic Chinese's potentially divided loyalties did not 
die down, but evolved into a comprehensive state-led effort toward assimilation. 
Decades of lasting attempts by the state to assimilate the Chinese, and, likewise, by 
some Chinese to be accepted, have made it difficult for Chinese to see previous 
nationality laws as anything but prejudiced. And to be fair, the extent to which the 
notion of indigeneity has been exploited by the authorities to alienate ethnic Chinese 
has made it challenging to recognize the inclusionary spirit demonstrated by the 
authors of the constitution in their initial definition of "citizen." Rather, the clause of 
indigeneity—"Indonesia asli"—has taken the center stage in the discourse concerning 
civic inequality and is identified not only as evidence, but altogether the source of 
discrimination. This also proves that the original intent of a legal clause does not 
always transmit unchanged over time; surely Oei Tjong Hauw and Oei Tiang Tjoei 
could not have foreseen the political implications of "asli" that would develop so soon 
after Indonesia's independence became a legal reality.105
100 Willmott, The National Status of the Chinese, p. 33.
101 In November 1959, then-President Soekarno passed a regulation (PP no. 10) for compulsory 
resettlement of (alien) Chinese retailers to urban areas. Following the 1959 and the 1965 events, large 
numbers of ethnic Chinese left Indonesia. Exact figures, however, are not known.
102 Setiono, Tionghoa dalam Pusaran Politik, p. 795.
103 See especially Chapters 3 to 5 of Charles A. Coppel's Indonesian Chinese in Crisis (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford 
University Press, 1983).
104 J. A. C. Mackie, The Chinese in Indonesia: Five Essays (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press, 1976), pp. 
111-28. It must be noted here that the primary victims of anti-Communist aggression were non-Chinese.
105 Oei Tjong Hauw did not live long enough to see the consequences of his choice. He died of a heart 
attack on January 21,1950, at the age of forty-five. See Go Sien Ay, "Lie Hoo Soen Digantung Jepang
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The politicization of indigeneity did not, in fact, begin with the nationality law, but 
derived from a series of policies, not unlike reverse affirmative action, installed in 1950 
by the Ministry of Welfare. This discussion, on the emergence of the politics of nativity 
in Indonesia, belongs to another essay and shall not detain us here. Suffice it to say that 
the policies were designed to support small business, but equated "feeble economies" 
(.ekomomis lemah) with Indonesians of indigenous pedigree. The very first edition of the 
Chinese-subsidized bi-monthly Republik, published under the directorship of the 
aforementioned Tjoa Sik Ien, criticized this "politics of nativity" (politik asli) and 
demanded "the anthropological measurements" by which one could be said to be 
indigenous to Indonesia.106 The consequence of this politics, the magazine argued, was 
"the emergence of first-class citizens and second-class [kelas kambing] citizens."107 The 
economic subtext in the politics of nativity marks a shift in the designation for 
"natives" in Indonesian—from boemipoetra that made up a racial taxonomy alongside 
"Dutch" and "Chinese" during the colonial period, to pribumi that often connotes 
economic disadvantage vis-a-vis ethnic Chinese.
Nevertheless, for Chinese-Indonesians, it is the definition of citizen, rather than 
economic inequality, that is the source of discrimination. In a celebratory essay on the 
ratification of the 2006 Nationality Law, for instance, a representative of a Chinese- 
Indonesian organization notes,
[T]he passing of this law is indeed revolutionary in that it terminates the 
polemics on who the indigenous Indonesian citizens are. Admittedly, since [the 
day of independence] until [the day the law was passed], the term "indigenous" 
has consumed a lot of energy. In fact, throughout our journey [as a nation], many 
lives have been lost in racial violence, especially of the people of Chinese descent, 
who are often regarded as "foreigners" or merely second-class people or second- 
class citizens [emphasis as in the original].108
Similarly, then-Minister of Law and Human Rights Awaludin wrote of his 
expectation that the new definition would put an end to divisive disputes on 
indigenous and non-indigenous citizens, and, accordingly, to the marginalization of 
ethnic Chinese.109 For many Chinese in particular, it is difficult to imagine that the 
clause on indigeneity was initially adopted for a purpose other than to deny them 
equal rights and privileges as citizens. It is even harder still to imagine that this 
supposedly exclusionary marker was sanctioned in part due to the Chinese's own 
disagreement (i.e., diversity of opinion) with regard to Indonesian citizenship.110
Karena Membela Oei Tjong Hauw, Putera Oei Tiong Ham," Sinergi Indonesia 48 (March 2007): 32, 51; and 
Sinergi Indonesia 49 (April 2007): 53-56.
106 "Berilah Isi! Pada Pengertian 'Warga Negara Indonesia/" Republik 1,1 (May 1950). See also "Lima Tahun 
Soal Warga Negara: Tidak Menjadi Selesai Malahan Timbul Poiitik Asli," Republik 1,8 (August 1950); and 
"Siapakah'Ekonomis Lemah'?," Republik 1,9 (September 1950).
107 "Politik 'Asli' Tidak Sah," Republik 1,9 (September 1950).
108 Tomy Su, "UU Kewarganegaraan, Lalu Apa?," Jalan Panjang Menjadi WNI, pp. 131-34.
109 Awaludin, "UU Kewarganegaraan." The minister's echoing of the Chinese critique of "asli" suggests 
that the historical amnesia is not limited to ethnic Chinese.
110 The enduring citizenship problem for Indonesian Chinese seems to go against Aihwa Ong's argument 
of flexible citizenship for overseas Chinese—that is, the multiplicity of subject positions available for 
Chinese individuals in transnational circuits, which enabled them to sidestep the nation-state intervention 
and localizing reach. In the case of Indonesia, increasing ethnic Chinese integration had to be traded with
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Conclusion
The ensuing euphoria upon the ratification of the 2006 Nationality Law tells us that 
many Chinese-Indonesians saw the previous laws as largely responsible for their 
marginal status. Using the definition of "citizen" found in the 1945 Constitution, 
Indonesian laws and regulations thus far had carefully distinguished indigenous 
citizens from citizens of foreign descent, in effect depriving Chinese-Indonesians of 
equality in many spheres—cultural, legal, economic, and social. Scholars traced the 
distinction between "indigenous" and "alien" back to the colonial construction of the 
Chinese as "foreigners" and the indigenous people of the Netherlands Indies as 
"natives." Such categorization and the ensuing marginality of ethnic Chinese in 
postcolonial Indonesia were thus understood in terms of "colonial legacies." In other 
words, the 1945 Constitution was not considered to be the root of the problem, but 
simply "a carrier of the colonial virus of racial separation."111
While such a view certainly has its merits, this essay takes a different path by 
highlighting one particular moment in history when definitions and categories were 
redrawn. My examination of the proceedings of the Investigative Committee for the 
Preparation of Indonesia's Independence reveals a lengthy discussion on the question 
of citizenship, which in and of itself proves that the locus, parameter, and categories of 
belonging were not straightforwardly inherited. The committee's hearing with the 
Chinese delegates, the rejection of Indonesian citizenship by one of the three 
representatives, and particularly two representatives' self-identification as Chinese 
nationals—at a moment as crucial as the drafting of the constitution—cannot be 
dismissed as inconsequential. It affords us a glimpse of a more dynamic process in the 
formation of categories—what groups constitute "Indonesians"?—in which the 
Chinese's opinions were not only sought out, but proved to be decisive. If anything, 
the hearing indicates that the distinction between indigenous citizens and those of 
foreign descent evolved through a complex process and was not simply imposed on 
the minority group. One can argue that, perhaps, the imagined difference between 
"Chinese" and "Indonesians," conditioned in part by Dutch colonization and the rise 
of Chinese nationalism, was already too substantial to be reconciled even by the 
constitution. Nevertheless, the conflicting responses provided by the Chinese at the 
hearing to the question of Indonesian citizenship not only squandered the opportunity 
to minimize this gap, but reinscribed the difference.
Furthermore, the prevalent perception among Chinese-Indonesians that the 
"indigenous vs. alien" distinction was motivated by racial prejudice suggests a 
conditioning of history, the filtering out of narratives that go against the Chinese's 
attempts to become legitimate members of the nation. If accounts of the Chinese 
delegates, such as Oei Tjong Hauw's statement, had not been filtered out, it would not 
be so difficult to see why ethnic Chinese had been perceived as non-Indonesians (thus
potential attachment with other polities. The new definition of "asli" is a barrier raised against flexible 
citizenship—that is, against those with a history of dual nationality, whose loyalty is seen as suspect.
111 See, for instance, Charles A. Coppel, "Chinese Indonesians in Crisis: 1960s and 1990s," Perspectives on 
the Chinese Indonesians, ed. M. R. Godley and G. J. Lloyd (Hindmarsh, S.A.: Crawford House, 2001), 
pp. 20-40.
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treated less than equal), or to see that the definition of citizen in the 1945 Constitution 
and in the subsequent nationality law was actually quite charitable. The 1945 
Constitution's reference to indigeneity was not out of the ordinary, or particularly 
discriminatory, as most Chinese at that time did not see themselves as part of the 
Indonesian nation. In their defense, it was still four years before the Indonesian state 
would be formally recognized.
